by Tim Harding B.Sc., B.A.
The idea that the future is already determined is known in philosophy as determinism. There are various definitions of determinism available; but in this essay, I shall use the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition, which is ‘the metaphysical thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future’ (McKenna, 2009:1.3).
This thesis presents a difficult problem for the concept of free will: how can we make free choices if all our actions are determined by the facts of the past and the laws of nature? A related but distinct question is: how can we be held morally responsible for our actions if we have no choices? Undesirable consequences like these are not sufficient reasons for declaring determinism to be false; but they can act (and have influenced many philosophers) as a powerful motivator towards resolving the apparent conflict between determinism and free will.
Some philosophers, such as Peter van Inwagen have gone as far as arguing that the existence of moral responsibility entails the existence of free will (Iredale 2012: 8). There are various other philosophical arguments in favour of free will – one of these is an apparent paradox known as Buridan’s Ass. Some scientists, such as Sam Harris argue in favour of determinism and claim that free will is an illusion. Leading contemporary philosopher John Searle thinks that the issue has still not been resolved, despite two centuries of philosophical and scientific debate.
Most people who are neither philosophers nor scientists seem to intuitively feel that they have free will and so when presented with this dilemma are more likely to choose free will over determinism (Iredale 2012:13). On the other hand, in my personal experience, scientists who think in terms of causes and effects are more likely to side with a determinist view. In this essay, I intend to argue that a solution to this dilemma lies not in choosing free will over determinism, nor vice versa; but in the theory that determinism and free will are compatible – known as compatibilism.
Before going on, let us be clear about what we mean by the term free will. Clarke & Capes (2013:1) have provided a useful definition:
‘To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—it is up to her whether she does one thing or another on that occasion. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action’.
So what does it take to act freely? Taylor (2012: 40) states that there are three essential characteristics to free actions. One is able to act freely only if:
(1) there is no obstacle that prevents you from doing A, and
(2) there is nothing that constrains or forces you to do A, and
(3) you could have done otherwise.
There is a diversity of philosophical views about the relationship between determinism and free will; but the higher-level taxonomy of these views may be summarised as follows. Those who hold that determinism and free will cannot both be true are known as incompatibilists. Within this category, those who claim that determinism is true – and therefore free will is impossible – are known as hard determinists. Those who claim that determinism is false and therefore that free will is at least possible are known as metaphysical libertarians (not necessarily related to political libertarians). Those who think that determinism and free will are compatible are known as compatibilists. There is also a range of sub-categories within the compatibilist camp; but I will only discuss a couple of them in this essay. This higher-level taxonomy can be visually described by the following diagram.
To be more specific, the following set of propositions is described by McKenna (2009:1.5) as the Classical Formulation of the free will problem:
1) ‘Some person (qua agent), at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did.
2) Actions are events.
3) Every event has a cause.
4) If an event is caused, then it is causally determined.
5) If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not have acted otherwise than in the way that she did’.
This formulation involves a mutually inconsistent set of propositions, and yet each is consistent with in our contemporary conception of the world, producing an apparent paradox. How can these inconsistencies be reconciled? Compatibilists would deny proposition 5). Incompatibilists, on the other hand, might move in a number of different directions, including the denial of propositions 1), 3) or 4) (McKenna, 2009:1.5).
According to Taylor (2012: 40), all versions of compatibilism (which he calls ‘soft determinism’) have three claims in common:
(i) Determinism is true.
(ii) We are free to perform an action A to the extent there are no obstacles that would prevent us from doing A, and we are not externally constrained (not forced by external causes) to do A.
(iii) The causes of free actions are certain states, events, or conditions within the agent himself, e.g., an agent’s own acts of will or volitions, or decisions, or desires, and so on.
Claim (i) is made in common with hard determinism. Claims (ii) and (iii) are where the compatibilists part company with the hard determinists and attempt to explain how free will can be compatible with determinism.
Taylor’s objection to compatibilism is essentially a challenge to Claim (iii); that is, that the certain states, events, or conditions within the agent herself are themselves caused by external factors, consistent with determinism.
My response to Taylor’s objection is that the certain states or conditions within the agent could include the person’s values, ethics, loyalties, priorities, and so on. Let us call these states or conditions within the agent ‘values’. These values may have external causes accumulated over the agent’s lifetime. The important point is that an agent’s values could give rise to more than one possible action by the agent, all of which are consistent with the agent’s values. Let us call these possible consistent actions ‘options’. When faced with a decision to make, a rational agent would be likely to consider the options available to her and choose the best option. In this way, the options available to the agent stem from causes but the agent is making a free choice within the range of options available.
A simple way of modelling this limited version of free will has been referred to by some philosophers as a ‘Garden of Forking Paths’ after the novel of the same name by Jorge Luis Borges (McKenna 2009:2.1; Iredale 2012: 14). In other words, there are alternative paths an agent could choose to take, but the paths available have been predetermined. Within this model, the agent meets the criterion of acting of her own free will, because she could have acted otherwise. Her ability to have acted otherwise is underwritten by her ability to have selected amongst, or chosen between, alternative courses of action (McKenna 2009:2.1).
It is possible that consciousness is an emergent psychological property of the material mind. Free will could be seen as a manifestation of consciousness. Whilst we cannot yet fully explain what consciousness is and how is works, there is little doubt that consciousness exists. If consciousness can exist, then so can free will.
Daniel Dennett (2003) has proposed a more elegant version of compatibilism with an evolutionary basis. Although in the strict physical sense our actions might be determined, we can still be free in all the ways that matter, because of the abilities we evolved. Seen this way, free will is the freedom to make decisions without duress, as opposed to an impossible and unnecessary freedom from causality itself. To clarify this distinction, he coins the term ‘evitability’ as the opposite of ‘inevitability’, defining it as the ability of an agent to anticipate likely consequences and act to avoid undesirable ones (Dennett 2003:56). Evitability is entirely compatible with, and actually requires, determinism; because without it, an agent cannot anticipate likely consequences and avoid them. Dennett provides us with the following explicit argument:
‘In some deterministic worlds there are avoiders avoiding harms. Therefore in some deterministic worlds some things are avoided. Whatever is avoided is avoidable or evitable. Therefore in some deterministic worlds not everything is inevitable. Therefore determinism does not imply inevitability’ (Dennett 2003:56).
Dennett (2003:58) also argues that there is a concept of chance that is compatible with determinism, which has been invoked to explain evolution via natural selection. Through these means, he endeavours to unyoke determinism from inevitability (Dennett 2003:60) .
In conclusion, I have offered two accounts of how free will may be compatible with determinism – my own and Daniel Dennett’s. However, I do not claim that either of these accounts has solved the dilemma. There are also, of course, many other accounts of compatibilism as well as objections to them, plus alternative theories such as hard determinism and metaphysical libertarianism. Indeed, resolving the dilemma between free will and determinism is very complicated and may be ‘one of the most persistent and heated deadlocks in Western philosophy’ (Nichols and Knobe 2007:1).
 Peter van Inwagen’s argument that free will is required for moral judgments is:
- The moral judgment that you shouldn’t have done X implies that you should have done something else instead.
- That you should have done something else instead implies that there was something else for you to do.
- That there was something else for you to do implies that you could have done something else.
- That you could have done something else implies that you have free will.
- If you don’t have free will to have done other than X we cannot make the moral judgment that you shouldn’t have done X (van Inwagen 2009).
 For those who would like to read more on this topic, there is an interesting online debate between Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. Dennett critiques Harris’ book on Free Will in a review titled Reflections on Free Will. Then Harris responds to Dennett’s critique in a rejoinder entitled The Marionette’s Lament.
Clarke, Randolph & Capes, Justin, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/incompatibilism-theories/>.
Dennett, Daniel. 2003 Freedom Evolves. London, Penguin.
Iredale, Matthew 2012 The Problem of Free Will. Durham, Acumen.
McKenna, Michael, ‘Compatibilism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/compatibilism/>.
Nichols, S. & Knobe, 2007 ‘Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Nous 41(4):663-85 in Iredale, Matthew 2012 The Problem of Free Will. Durham, Acumen.
Taylor, Richard. (1976) ‘Freedom, Determinism and Fate’; printed in Time, Self and Mind Study Guide, Monash, 2012:40-47.
van Inwagen, Peter (2009). The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will. Oxford.
Copyright notice: © All rights reserved. Except for personal use or as permitted under the Australian Copyright Act, no part of this website may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, communicated or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written permission. All inquiries should be made to the copyright owner, Tim Harding at firstname.lastname@example.org, or as attributed on individual blog posts.
If you find the information on this blog useful, you might like to consider supporting us.